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Context
• Side channel analysis is a major threat against 
cryptographic implementations
Several  leakage  channels : 
Time
Several  analysis  algorithms :
Power
EM
…
Simple
Differential
Higher-order Differential
Correlation
Behavioral
…
Several  Countermeasures :
Random Masking
Dual-rail Implementations
Fake Computations (Noise)
Register Renaming
…
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Outline
• Experimental Setup
• Encryption IPs
– @ Montpellier : DES Jamming 
– @ Grenoble : AES Morph 
– @ Gardanne : AES Dual
– Attacks and Results for each IP
• Perspectives
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Experimental Setup
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DES algorithm
• Symmetric block cipher
– Ptx 64b, Key 56b
• Feistel network
– 16 rounds
• Round operations
– Key Addition
– Sbox
– Permutation
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DES Jamming (1/3) 
• What the countermeasure does
– Resources randomly compute and store different 
values,
– All parts are always activated
• What the countermeasure does not
– Instantiate functional units for the sole purpose of 
computing random operations
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DES Jamming (2/3) 
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DES Jamming (3/3) 
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Attacking DES Jamming
• Implementation :
– Spartan 3 1000
– Freq: 50 MHz (vs 108)
– Slices: 1105 (vs 294, +276%)
• Attack: CPA-HW, SCAN
• Data set: 500k traces
• Results: only 7 sub-keys obtained
– All sub-keys obtained after 200-600 traces w/o 
countermeasure
9
ANR EMAISeCi @ CryptArchi 2012 : 
Maistri, Tiran, Dehbaoui, Maurine, Dutertre – Countermeasures against EM Analysis
AES algorithm
• Symmetric block cipher
– Ptx 128b, 
– Key 128/192/256b
• SPN cipher
– 10/12/14 rounds
128-bit
Round Key
128-bit
Round Key
4x4-byte
State
Encryption
Secret Key Plain Text
• Round operations
– SubBytes
– ShiftRows
– MixColumns
– Key Addition
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Key
Schedule
Round
Key
Schedule
Round
Round
SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumn
Ciphered Text
AES Morph (1/3)
 Quite small
 32-bit data-path
 4 Substitution Boxes
 4 GF Multipliers for 
MixColumns
 10 clock cycles per round
 On-the-fly key unrolling Input
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AddRoundKey and State
2-stage S-Box
Register layer
Combinatorial logic
8-bit signal
32-bit signal
(using shared S-Boxes)
<<<
SBOX SBOX SBOX SBOX
From 
Key Unit
To 
Key Unit
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AES Morph (2/3)
• Dynamic resource allocation done intra-round
• Column relocation
– Several external constraints (MixColumns, ShiftRows, …)
– Only 4 different configurations
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AES Morph (3/3)
• For each S-Box, implement several parallel mappings
– From 1 to 8 possible dynamic mappings
– Choose randomly at runtime
– At the output, choose the correct inverse mapping to get back the 
result
• Limited to S-Box data path 
• Independence ?
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Attacking AES Morph
• Implementation :
– Spartan 3 1000
– Freq: 50 MHz
– Slices: 1445 (vs 1199, +20%)
• Attack: CPA-HW
• Data set: 200k traces
• Results: 
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No countermeasures 
vs CPA
Countermeasures 
vs CPA
Countermeasures 
vs SCAN
~21k traces ~80k traces ~60k traces
AES Dual (1/2)
Dual Path
Main Path
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AES Dual (2/2)
S
B
E
r
r
o
r
 
m
a
t
r
i
x
S
R
M
C
R
o
n
d
e
i
S
B
d
u
a
l
E
r
r
o
r
 
m
a
t
r
i
x
M
C
d
u
a
l
R
o
n
d
e
16
ANR EMAISeCi @ CryptArchi 2012 : 
Maistri, Tiran, Dehbaoui, Maurine, Dutertre – Countermeasures against EM Analysis
Attacking AES Dual
• Implementation:
ST 130 nm
50 MHz
1.2 V 200
250
Guessing Entropy
• Attack: 
CPA
• Data set: 
332k traces
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Converging !
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Conclusions
• DES Jamming 
– Too few configurations, too little entropy
• AES Morph
– Too few configurations, too little entropy
– Dynamic mapping useless (due to other leakage)
• AES Dual
– Quite strong !
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Perspectives
• AES Morph
– Increase number of configurations (intra-round + 
inter-round)
– Mapping under new analysis
• Next:
– EM fault attacks and countermeasures!
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